I. Introduction
Hedge fund activism has dramatically changed corporate governance-arguably revolutionizing it. Almost everyone agrees with this assessment, but they disagree over whether this change is for the better or the worse. The more optimistic see hedge fund activists as desirable agents of change, who intentionally invest in underperforming companies to organize the other shareholders to support their proposals (which usually seek to increase leverage and shareholder payout, trim marginal operations, and/or change senior management).
1 So viewed, the process may seem a model of shareholder democracy, as the activists make proposals, managements respond, and the balance of the shareholders (who are largely sophisticated institutional investors) decide the issue. From this perspective, the result is governance by referendum, with a well-informed debate, followed by a vote. All that is new here is the appearance of an entrepreneurial intermediary (the activist hedge fund), who searches for underperforming companies, makes proposals, and lobbies the other shareholders, who hold the balance of power, to act in their mutual self-interest.
Those who are more skeptical of activism point out that things do not actually work this simply. unless he or she settles. 3 Wholly apart from whether there are private benefits to the activist, this process places the activist's nominees on the board, even though it holds only 5% or so of the stock, without any majoritarian consent from the other shareholders. Often, the activist advances an agenda that may not be supported by the other shareholders. Indeed, growing reason exists to believe that diversified institutional investors and undiversified activist funds often have distinctly different agendas, and the former are beginning to object that they have been excluded from the decision-making process. From this latter perspective, one does not see the simple democracy of the Swiss canton, but instead a process of disenfranchisement. The distance between these two perspectives largely turns on the fact that private settlements may result in different outcomes than shareholder elections do, and this highlights a problem that, as will be seen, has a long history in corporate governance.
This article does not assert that one side in this debate is entirely right and the other side entirely wrong. Rather, it seeks to make and then investigate an assertion that is almost definitionally correct: a new agent (the hedge fund activist) has emerged in corporate governance, purportedly to act for all the other shareholders (or at least a majority of them). But, as new agents arise, new agency costs will also surface --unless the agent's interests are perfectly aligned with those of the other shareholders (and this seems highly doubtful). 4 Indeed, agency costs are inevitable whenever intermediaries purport to act for others-and, particularly to the extent that they possess discretion. These new costs do not mean that the process is fatally flawed, but they do suggest that some controls may be desirable because the loyalty of the agent cannot simply be assumed. 3 Lazard's Shareholder Advisory Group reports that, since 2013, annualized CEO turnover at activist targets has averaged 23% compared to 12% for non-targets. See Lazard's Shareholder Advisory Group, Review of Shareholder Activism-3Q 2017 at 1. For the even higher rate of turnover if activist nominees go onto the board, see text and notes infra at note 47 (reporting study by FTI Consulting showing that the CEO turnover rate rises to 55.1% over two years if activists place one or more nominees on the board). 4 The term "agency costs", first defined by Jensen and Meckling, refers to the costs that arise because of the use by a principal of an agent and include (1) the costs of opportunistic behavior by the agent (such as when the agent pursues its own self-interest, rather than the principal's), (2) the costs of monitoring the agent incurred by the principal, and (3) the "bonding" costs incurred by the agent to induce the principal to rely on it. See Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
Fin. Econ. 305 (1976)_
To the extent that hedge fund activists present themselves as the champion of all the shareholders, it is useful to compare this putative champion to another shareholder champion who also can behave opportunistically: the plaintiff's attorney in shareholder litigation. A plaintiff shareholder, suing, for example, for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty in a derivative action, will claim to act as the champion of all the dispersed shareholders, who themselves lack sufficient incentive to undertake costly litigation. If the litigation is successful, all shareholders should share in the recovery to the corporation, and the corporation will pay the plaintiff's costs and legal fees. In principle, this sounds like an optimal solution to the dispersion of shareholders in the public corporation. Unfortunately, however, an objective contemporary appraisal of shareholder litigation has to be more mixed. Typically, a high percentage of shareholder litigation falls into a category known as "merger objection" cases. 5 Indeed, any merger involving a sizable public corporation today has a high probability of attracting litigation brought by a plaintiff shareholder, who will assert a disclosure violation or fiduciary breach-even when there is no discernible conflict of interest (as there generally is not in the standard arm's length merger). Almost invariably, these "merger objection" cases settle on a "disclosure only" basis, with no financial recovery, and with the class receiving only some additional disclosures of little value, while the plaintiff's counsel obtains a negotiated award of attorney's fees. 6 In effect, the merger is thus taxed, not by a legitimate shareholder champion or even a Robin Hood, but by a modern-day highwayman. Correspondingly, just as the plaintiff's attorney benefits mainly himself in these cases, so too in the world of hedge fund activism, activists may sometimes use private settlements to benefit themselves more than the other shareholders. 5 In recent years, as many as 95% of all mergers involving sizable public corporations have attracted shareholder litigation that asserted fiduciary or disclosure breaches. Almost all these cases settle on a non-pecuniary basis under which the defendant company agrees to make revised disclosures to its shareholders, but pays no cash award (other than attorney's fees to the plaintiff's counsel). These are known as "disclosure only" settlements. For a review of the statistics, see John C. Coffee, Jr. ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: Its Rise, Fall and Future (2015) at pages 86 to 91. Given the incentives of the target management and board to seek the highest possible price for their firm, this high litigation rate would seem to reflect not fiduciary abuse, but plaintiff's attorneys' readiness to exploit "nuisance" litigation. A roadmap for this article is now in order. After this introduction, this article will begin by attempting in to map in Part II the private settlement process surrounding hedge fund "engagements" to show how it differs from a simple democratic model. Part III will then turn to the potential agency costs that are inherent in this new process. Again, this mapping is undertaken not to demonstrate that the shareholder activist must be deterred, but more to suggest where greater controls and transparency is needed. Then, Part IV will turn to potential reforms. Here, two issues stand out: (1) Are these feasible ways to enable other shareholders to resist these private settlements when they substantially change the composition of the board?; and 2) How can the agency costs associated with this new activism best be minimized? After a century of focusing on the perceived domination of shareholders by management, American corporate law needs to focus today, at least, equally on the potential for overreaching by an organized minority of the shareholders.
Part V will then shift to broader normative concerns and intellectual history. This article's focus on the agency costs of hedge fund activism draws upon a new scholarly literature that has distinguished "vertical" agency costs from "horizontal" agency costs. 7 The classic "vertical" costs were those associated with holding management accountable. But, as scholars studying venture capital have noted, conflicts can also arise among different groups of shareholders who acquired their stock at different times and with different rights. Some shareholders may be able to act opportunistically with respect to the others.
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Similarly, as the "vertical" agency costs of corporate governance are minimized and management is made more accountable, activists at public corporations may increasingly be able to act opportunistically with respect to two other groups: (1) other shareholders who (for various reasons) have traditionally been passive, and (2) stakeholders (in particular, creditors and employees). In particular, this article will assert that a "horizontal" conflict has arisen between activists (who tend to be short-term holders) and indexed institutional investors (who tend to be long-term investors and regard themselves as the company's "permanent shareholders").
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As this conflict intensifies, the role of management changes. In the past, managements and boards of directors at public companies have professed that their core responsibility was to balance the interests of all stakeholders. The larger the company, the more likely that its management would take such a stance. But this balancing (to the extent that it in fact occurred) may have been at least partially a product of high agency costs that sheltered management from shareholder pressure. Once that protection is removed and management loses the discretion it once had, management and the board may come under greater pressure to transfer wealth from creditors and employees to shareholders. Indeed, abundant evidence exists that hedge fund activism has cost creditors significantly and systematically. 9 In addition, some evidence suggests that shareholder pressure, organized and directed by activist hedge funds, may 8 Studies differ slightly on how long the typical activist holds its stake in the "engaged" firm. One study places the median duration between a Schedule 13D filing and the activist's exit at 369 days, but a more recent study places the median duration at 266 days. The majority of the seats filled by activists go to persons resembling traditional independent directors, but Lazard found in 2016 that 27% of contested board seats went to employees of the activist fund. 24 This statistic is important for a number of reasons, including that there appears to be greater information leakage when hedge fund employees are placed on the board (as later discussed).
On balance, the rate of hedge fund activism is increasing. Although the number of activist campaigns fell somewhat in 2016, the actual number of seats won by activists increased. 25 The even more significant statistic may be the number of new entrants into this field. Lazard found that 37 activist investors initiated activist campaigns for the first time in 2016. 26 This increase suggests that these firsttime activists saw profits to be made from the activity of activism and joined the parade.
As earlier noted, activist campaigns generally result in a settlement, which is usually embodied in a settlement agreement. These agreements, which are typically (but not always) filed with the SEC, have seldom been studied. One large scale study has been recently released by Professor Lucian Bebchuk and 12 several colleagues, 27 but it goes only until 2011, and much has changed since then. Typically, these settlement agreements will address a number of topics, including board composition, standstill provisions, expense reimbursement for the activist, "non-disparagement" provisions, and, possibly, confidentiality provisions (which may or may not restrict the new director or director nominee from sharing information learned at board meetings with others, including the hedge fund). Such provisions, as next discussed, raise the possibility that the hedge fund activist may receive benefits not available to other shareholders.
A principal conclusion of the Bebchuk study is that these agreements do not address the business operations or policies of the corporation, but rather focus only on the composition of the board. 28 Bebchuk and his colleagues conclude that this shows the efficiency of "incomplete contracting." Those more experienced in corporate law would recognize that there is a simpler (if theoretically less elegant) explanation for this focus: directors, as fiduciaries, cannot contract away their discretion. As many cases have held, a contract binding the director, for example, to vote for increased dividends or a share buyback would be unenforceable. 29 Instead, the settlement agreement must focus on what can be agreed upon:
namely, how shareholders will vote for directors and which directors will agree to resign. "Incomplete contracting," at least as an explanation for the structure of settlement agreements, works better in the hothouse of academia than in the real world.
In any event, it is clear that, in a high majority of settlement agreements, new directors are added to the board, usually through an expansion of the board's size. 30 According to the Bebchuk study, the median number of directors so added is two (although, in at least a few recent cases, majority slates of . 30 The study by Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues finds that new directors are added in 87.4% of the settlements they surveyed and some incumbent directors leave the board in 40.77% of these settlements. See Bebchuk, supra note #, at 21. Thus, the board will typically need to be expanded, which can ordinarily be done by bylaw or board resolution if the corporate charter so authorizes.
directors nominated by activists have been elected, giving the activist fund de facto control). 31 The only other provision that is nearly universal is a standstill provision. The costs incurred by activists are growing. In the recent and unsuccessful campaign by the Trian Fund to place Nelson Peltz, its founder, on the Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") board, Trian estimated its expected costs at $25 million, but acknowledged that they could run higher. 34 Had Trian assembled a majority block to support its candidate in advance of the shareholders' meeting, P&G could have sought a 31 For the finding that the median number is two, see Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 17. Still, this study does note that in 17 cases, the number elected was four or more. In 2016, well after the 2011 end date of the Bebchuk study, Mantle Ridge, an activist fund, elected a majority slate of directors to the board of CSX. Corp. and brought in a new CEO, even though Mantle Ridge held only around a 5% stake in CSX. 32 Bebchuk and his colleagues also describe a "standstill" provisions as "almost universal" (Id at p.6 ) and observe that there can be two types of standstill provisions: (1) a limitation on share ownership by the activist, and (2) a "corporate governance standstill" under which the solicitations of proxies or other actions are halted. Other conflicts also inevitably exist. When the hedge fund designates a director or directors (some of whom may be hedge fund employees), it will typically remain in close contact with its appointed directors and will likely obtain material, non-public information from them. 36 Potentially, the hedge fund could use that information itself, or it could pass it onto allies. This behavior, depending on its facts, may or may not be unlawful under the federal securities laws, or under Delaware law, but regardless, it is an agency cost to the extent it injures the corporation or widens the bid/ask spread. The issue of legality will be delayed until later, but the potential conflict could not be clearer.
A final area where there may be a "horizontal" conflict between the interests of the activist and the other shareholders involves the choice and agenda of the new directors. Diversified institutional shareholders, possibly holding even more stock, might prefer different directors with very different objectives. Recently, BlackRock, Inc. the world's largest investment manager, the Vanguard Group, another of the world's largest investment managers, and SSGA, also a very sizeable investment manager, have all publicly criticized hedge fund activists and the recent settlement process, suggesting that they perceive themselves as having been excluded by these private agreements from the role they deserve as "permanent shareholders", often holding more stock than the activists. 37 Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues discount these criticisms, because they find that the nominees selected by activist hedge funds do not receive a lesser vote in subsequent director elections. The problem with this analysis, however, is 35 There are many things that corporate management might want in return for reimbursement, including: (1) a standstill agreement under which the activist agrees not to buy more stock or launch any proxy fight, and (2) a nondisparagement agreement under which the activist agrees not to criticize management publicly. All that need be concluded at this stage is that activists will usually resolve their differences with the firms they engage through private negotiations that typically change the composition of the board. In the aftermath, the CEO will frequently depart. 38 This process clearly does focus on underperforming firms, but it has begun to trouble much larger institutional investors, who consider themselves the target corporation's "permanent" shareholders.
III. Agency Costs: A Brief Tour
It is possible to hypothesize a variety of ways in which that the activist hedge fund can gain private benefits not available to other shareholders or can act contrary to the wishes of the majority of the shareholders because of the leverage it possesses. The empirical evidence is still limited, but enough exists to raise serious concerns. Let us begin with a brief survey:
A. Private Payments It is not uncommon for a corporation "engaged" by an activist hedge fund to agree to reimburse the fund for the expenses that the fund allegedly incurred in connection with the engagement. These expenses might include SEC filing fees, legal expenses, or the costs of an actual proxy campaign (if one was conducted or if a draft proxy statement was prepared). Here, the Sotheby's campaign stands out with its $10 million payment to Third Point.
How typical is such a large payment? The Bebchuk study includes no findings on this issue, but I am currently involved with an effort to tabulate data on 475 settlement agreements extending up to 2015.
I will not here release any of the findings of that study, but payments on the same order of magnitude as that paid by Sotheby's to Third Point are rare. Although reimbursement is not uncommon, the amounts so 38 The Bebchuk study finds that 18.6% of CEOs depart within a year after the settlement agreement (although only about 3% of such agreements provide for the CEO's departure). See Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 16. A more recent study by FTI Consulting places the departure rates for CEO's after activist nominees are added to the board at 34.1% and 55.1% over one and two years, respectively, following these appointments. See Sonali Bazak and Beth Jinks, "Activist Directors Double Chance of CEO exits, study shows," Bloomberg News, October 12, 2016 paid are usually modest. Because significant and legitimate legal expenses are incurred by activists in conducting engagements, this may suggest that activists feel constrained in seeking reimbursement by a fear of reputational damage if they disclosed a substantial payment. Alternatively, the activist may want to proclaim that it made such a large profit on its engagement that it does not need to be concerned with penny-ante matters, such as expense reimbursement. Of course, it is conceivable that some activists may receive a sizable payment, but fail to report it on the ground that it is not financially material. Still, this seems unlikely for a variety of reasons.
39
What does the corporation gain for its payment? Possibly, the corporation may negotiate a standstill provision and/or a "non-disparagement" provision in the settlement agreement. These provisions, which are very common in settlement agreements, bar the activist from acquiring more shares, launching a proxy contest, or voicing public criticism of the corporation and its management for the duration of the agreement. Arguably, the activist, as champion of the shareholders, is silenced. Pacific to take the position at CSX. 40 Although the transaction produced a major stock price jump in CSX's stock, others have noted the shareholders had little choice, as Harrison had indicated that he would 39 One reason is that management of the target would also need to make a disclosure about the settlement agreement, and the possibility that both would agree not to disclose the payment seems small in my judgment. Cases such as CSX show both that shareholders may be pressured to ratify steps taken by their activist champion and that shareholders can earn extraordinary stock gains from activism. Obviously, shareholders want to reduce agency costs without eliminating the shareholder gains, and a balance needs to be struck.
B. Information Leakage
An important study by my colleagues Robert Jackson and Joshua Mitts, along with Robert
Bishop, finds that the appointment of activist nominee or nominees to a corporate board is followed by a short-term increase in information leakage into the target's stock price. 42 That is, once activists' nominees are placed on the board, the stock price of the targeted corporation moves in advance of the disclosure of material information in the direction that this disclosure produces. In short, the market anticipates the later corporate disclosure. The most plausible explanation for this pattern is that informed trading by those with access to material, nonpublic information is decoded by other traders to imply an approaching gain or loss.
Specifically, this study concluded that:
(1) The appointment of activist-nominated directors "causes material information regarding the firm and its operations to become more 'leaky'; that is, more of that information makes its way into the company's stock price prior to the disclosure of that information than in two groups of control firms we use;" 
. This study is acknowledged in a footnote in the Bebchuk study, but those authors decline to discuss it. See Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 4 n. 4. Its relevance to their benign view of hedge fund activism is, however, undeniable. 43 Id at 1-2. As this figure shows, the trends are approximately parallel prior to the intervention, but they diverge thereafter as the spreads increase for the treatment group. 44 Id at 2. 45 Id. 46 Id at Figure 7 .
Because this study was based on a data set of 475 settlements, extending over a fifteen-year period and continuing up until 2015, 47 it furnishes compelling evidence that activist engagements are associated with information leakage and widened bid/ask spreads-most clearly in cases where a fund employee goes on the board. This differential between the "inside" fund employee and the "outside" expert should not be surprising, as the former simply has more reason to leak or tip (and probably more actively trading friends and colleagues). Still, one must be careful here not to claim too much; this study does not prove that activist funds are engaged in unlawful insider trading or that they are tipping others (even negligently) who engage in informed trading. For our purposes, the legality of this trading is not the immediate issue. From an agency cost perspective, the cost to shareholders is the same whether the widened spread was produced by unlawful tipping or simply negligent handling of the confidential information.
The implications of this study are particularly important in understanding what is driving hedge fund activism. If activist engagements culminating in the appointment of fund-nominated directors are followed by informed trading (whether or not unlawful), then activism is receiving a subsidy. Subsidies logically increase the level of the subsidized activity. That is, any subsidy to hedge fund activism would logically encourage an increase in the number of activist engagements, even if these engagements do not produce value for the other shareholders. To illustrate, suppose an activist fund expends $100,000 in expenses (which are not reimbursed) over a six-month period and eventually appoints two directors to the target's board. Assume further that the stock price moves up and down in a volatile fashion over the six month period following their appointment to the board, but ultimately no long-term increase in the target's stock price results. Shareholders in this target thus gain nothing (and probably bear some costs in the form of the legal expenses incurred by their company and the diverted executive time). Still, the activist (or its allies) make $500,000 in profits from informed stock trading in the secondary market over this interval. As a result, the entire transaction produces no gain for shareholders generally (and probably 47 Id at 1. some social waste), but it does yield a significant private benefit. When private gains cause public waste, the result is socially inefficient.
The bottom line is that access to material, non-public information gives rise to an invisible subsidy to activism that logically both inflates the rate of activist engagements and encourages inefficient engagements that do not generate value for the other shareholders (but do generate profits for informed traders). Again, this does not mean that hedge fund activism is itself undesirable or inefficient, but only that it is receiving a perverse subsidy.
Still, who benefits and how is this subsidy allocated? Normally, the activist signs a standstill agreement with the target firm? 48 But this may be less a barrier than it first appears, for several reasons:
First, a standstill agreement would not, without more, prevent shortselling or trading in put and call options (which are the least costly way of exploiting material non-public information). Second, although private settlement agreements vary substantially in the restrictions they impose, most do not expressly bar trading by the activist or its employees, and relatively few require the target company's consent to the sharing of confidential information. 49 Instead, they typically recite a formula that the activist will obey the law.
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Even if not contractually constrained, the activist firm may not dare trade, itself, in the target's stock for fear of legal exposure, but its employees and allies may feel less constrained. Possibly, they may trade through hidden agents. If the hedge fund or its employees share material, nonpublic information acquired from access to the target's board with the fellow members of its "wolf pack" of allies, such trading by these allies would be both harder to detect and legally more difficult to prosecute.
Alternatively, employees of the hedge fund may just enjoy gossiping with their professional colleagues at 48 As noted earlier, the Bebchuk study finds that a standstill provision in settlement agreements is "almost universal." Bebchuk, supra note 27, at p. 6. 49 I will not reveal the results of our survey of 475 settlement agreements here, but only a small number actually require the company's specific consent to the sharing of confidential information. 50 Often, the settlement agreement will provide: "Each investor acknowledges that it is aware that the United States securities laws prohibit any person who has received material, non-public information concerning the Company from purchasing or selling." Other times, the provision will require only that the activist fund inform persons with whom it shares the information that it is confidential information, which the recipient may be restricted from using or sharing.
other firms, possibly anticipating that their sharing of information will earn them reciprocal favors in the future. This implicit view of Wall Street as a giant "favor bank" in which a norm of reciprocity prevails seems consistent with the facts of some recent cases, including Newman. 51 Finally, the activist fund's tipping might be perfectly lawful. For example, if the activist fund secures a promise of confidentiality from an ally (e.g., another activist investor), it can share confidential, nonpublic information with it and indeed may have a legitimate corporate purpose for so doing.
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The activist fund's motivation to share material, non-public information is easy to understand. By itself, it typically holds considerably less than 10% of the target's stock (usually more like 6% to 7%).
From such a base, it has only a modest advantage over management in a proxy fight. But if it can assemble a "wolf pack" coalition holding 20% or more, it has a substantial advantage, and management would have to win 62.5% of the remaining vote (on these facts) to stave off defeat. Why do allies flock to support an activist fund? One answer may be that access to material, non-public information is a powerful incentive. Even if these "wolf pack" allies doubt the logic of the activist's proposals, they may still anticipate that they can profit from early access to undisclosed material information. Moreover, it is logical to anticipate that there will be market-moving announcements in the near future, given the activist's plans. In all likelihood, most of the "wolf pack" allies will agree with the activist fund's proposals, but the key point is this: access to nonpublic information offers "wolf pack" members an attractive, short-term return, even if the activist's proposal proves flawed or is rebuffed. The allies in the "wolf pack" can profit, regardless of whether the activist's plans fizzle, are abandoned, or blocked.
51 In United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), the defendants were fourth and fifth level "remote" tippees, and the information moved from employees in one firm to those in another firm, seemingly as a gift. Although Newman is no longer good law in light of later decisions, the fact pattern illustrates how information flows within the industry. 52 For example, if the activist fund is trying to organize a proxy contest, it may be in the best interests of the fund's investors for its managers to share information with prospective allies (at least if it secures a promise of confidentiality). The goal of winning a proxy fight requires it to search for allies and explain its reasoning. Regulation Fair Disclosure explicitly recognizes that material non-public information may be shared with those who agree to preserve its confidentiality. See Regulation FD, 17 CFR § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (providing that Regulation FD does not apply to a disclosure to a person "who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence"). Of course, those who promise confidentiality may not comply (or they may tip still others who do not comply).
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Of course, we do not know that the activist's allies in the "wolf pack" think or behave in this way.
But we do know that someone is trading actively and disproportionately once a hedge fund insider goes on the board. Equally important, we know that the market expects such trading, which is why the bid/ask spread widens on the appointment of a hedge fund employee to the board. To ignore the market's reactions is to wear a self-imposed blindfold.
To sum up, even if we do not know whether illegality is occurring, we have evidence that there is a perverse subsidy fueling hedge fund activism. The gains to those engaged in informed trading are matched by an agency cost to other shareholders: namely, the widening of the bid/ask spread. In fairness,
one cannot yet estimate the size of this subsidy. All that is clear is that the desire for access to nonpublic information is strong and could motivate some to join a "wolf pack" and support the lead activist, even if the activist's proposals struck them as illogical or infeasible. Access to nonpublic information could be the social cement that holds together an otherwise unstable "wolf pack," because those desiring information in advance of its release to the market need to stay in the wolf pack to gain access.
C. The Impact on Board Diversity.
Much evidence exists that hedge fund activism is retarding or reversing the movement towards greater board diversity. The data is fairly clear. A recent white paper by Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute ("IRRC") analyzed 380 directors appointed between 2011 and 2015 as the result of settlement agreements or in response to activist pressure. 53 Only 8.4% of these directors were women (as opposed to 28.9% of new directors at S&P 500 firms), and only 4.6% were persons of color, and only one minority female director was appointed out of those 380 appointments.
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Although the adverse impact on the goal of diversity is clear, there can be more debate about whether this should be regarded as an agency cost. If one believes greater board diversity is a means towards maximizing shareholder value, this is an agency cost. Conversely, if one believes that some institutional investors are exposed to political pressure from ideological activists and, as a result, only mouth an insincere preference for diversity, there is no agency cost here. But, based on their public statements, even private institutional investors (who are exposed to much less pressure than a public pension fund) have come to support greater diversity.
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Phrased more broadly, the potential agency cost here is that the majoritarian preference is being thwarted. As next seen, this example is a special case of a more general phenomenon: activism may be frequently preempting the majority's preferences.
D. Preempting the Majority's Preference
The heyday of hedge fund activism began a decade or so ago when traditional institutional investors (who are typically diversified, often indexed, and generally passive) began to support the proposals advanced by activist hedge funds. That support enabled hedge funds typically holding less than 10% of an issuer's stock to compel management to negotiate with them for fear of otherwise losing a hostile proxy fight in which the diversified institutional investors would vote to support the undiversified hedge funds.
But more recently, that alliance has come under strain. A fissure has clearly developed between hedge fund activists and an institutional investor community that fears the short-term bias of activism.
Originally, major diversified institutions attacked the goals of the activists. SSGA objected to the substance of these agreements (which they saw as inducing the company to focus on the short-term), but even more to the process. Procedurally, they believed themselves to be disenfranchised by these private settlements. In its 2016 statement, SSGA made a number of specific proposals as to the duration of such agreements, the requisite holding period for shares held by activists, the pledging of activist shares, and the need for fund-nominated directors to resign in certain circumstances. 60 Procedurally, SSGA announced they would engage with companies ex post to evaluate 60 Specifically, SSGA objected to the following: Duration. SSGA estimated that the duration of most settlement agreements ran from six to eighteen months, and it suggested that the agreements continue for a longer period (but it did not specify the proposed duration).
Share Holding Periods. SSGA argued that "an activist firm should be required to hold its shares for long periods from the date of the settlement to align them with longer-termed shareholders." Id at 2. these settlements. Unfortunately, this resembles locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen.
Once a financial engineering strategy has been undertaken or activist directors appointed, these steps are not easily reversed.
Thus, although SSGA's critique won much applause, it did not outline a feasible strategy for the future, and managements engaged by activists would predictably continue to take the course of least resistance and settle privately. Accordingly, the next section will focus on feasible strategies, both to protect the long-term shareholder from disenfranchisement and to reduce the subsidy that informed trading may be providing to fuel activism.
IV. Practical Reforms
Two basic problems have been identified to this point: (1) Informed trading may represent a hidden subsidy for activism, which could inflate the rate of activism, as activist campaigns may yield some (including the activist's allies) low-risk profit; and (2) Long-term shareholders (largely diversified pension and mutual funds, but also exchange traded funds) may be disenfranchised, if risk-averse managements would rather privately settle with the activist than undertake a risky fight or enter into broader negotiations with all the shareholders. On the assumption that legislation is unlikely (and Congress dysfunctional), this section will focus on self-help reforms and possible SEC rules on the premise that the least drastic means should be preferred.
A. Protecting Against Disenfranchisement
Let's start with a realistic assumption: once an activist appears, management cannot be trusted to side with the majority of the shareholders. Management wants to avoid a costly public proxy fight that it could lose and that would likely result in its eventual ouster. Thus, it is prepared to reach a weak, Neville Chamberlain-like compromise: namely, it will offer two seats on its board for "peace in our time." In .Minimum Ownership Thresholds. SSGA objected to reduction the activist's stake in the target and asked companies to require directors nominated by activists to tender their resignations if the activists' ownership level fell below a required minimum threshold.
Restrictions on Pledging. SSGA would limit both short sales and pledging of shares by activists, which conduct, it said, could endanger the company's stock price.
Executive Compensation. SSGA objected to using earnings per share as the primary determinant of CEO compensation.
reality, much as in Neville Chamberlain's case, management seldom gets the peace it sought, because the appointment of activist directors is regularly followed by the departure of the CEO within a year or two. 61 Still, managements can hope, and so they settle.
Corporate managements also have more reason to fear hedge fund activists than diversified investors, even if the latter hold more stock. This is because undiversified hedge funds hold a small portfolio, are focused on only one or two campaigns at a time, and have shown in the past that they will undertake the costs of a proxy fight. In contrast, diversified investors may own 1% stakes in hundreds of stocks, have modest staffs, and are unlikely to take action with respect to an individual stock that represents only a small proportion of their portfolio. They may vote for or against the activist, but they are reluctant to incur costs.
In this light, it is impractical to expect an SSGA to take a seat on any of the hundreds of boards that have reason to fear an activist attack in the near future. SSGA does not have sufficient qualified staff to cover the waterfront and monitor closely all the companies in its portfolio. Indeed, even if a corporation were to ask it to place a representative on its board (in order to signal the corporation's willingness to resist activists), SSGA might logically decline, because the presence of an SSGA employee on a corporation's board could restrict its ability to sell that stock (for fear of insider trading liability).
Passive investors are passive for a reason: they logically prefer liquidity to control.
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What then can we realistically expect of diversified institutional investors? Here are two possibilities: First, investors, such as SSGA and BlackRock, who fear they are being disenfranchised by private settlements, could form (with other similarly-minded institutions) a steering committee and assemble a team of outside directors (who were not their employees) that they could seek to place on corporate boards in the event of an activist attack. This would take some advance preparation, but the 61 A study by FTI Consulting in 2016 found that CEO turnover when activist nominees gain board seats was 34.1% and 55.1% over the one and two year period, respectively, following the board appointments. The normal CEO turnover rates are 16.6% and 30.9% over a one and two year periods, respectively. See Sonali Basak and Beth Jinks, "Activist investors double chance of CEO exits, study shows," Bloomberg News, October 12, 2016. 62 The author has made this argument at considerable length elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991). Hedge Funds, being undiversified, are an exception to this generalization. effort and expense could be shared among the dozen (or more) institutions participating in such a committee. This committee could contact the corporation at the outset of an activist campaign to suggest either its own nominees or its desired to be involved in the settlement process. To be sure, some corporations would not welcome this development (as it would complicate their negotiations), but others might see it as giving management more negotiating leverage. This committee would have no authority to bind its members and would act only when it had the support of a majority of its members.
Second, diversified investors, working with ISS or a similar body, could adopt a shareholderapproved bylaw that would preclude board action either to expand the board's size or elect persons to vacancies on the board under certain circumstances. For example, such a bylaw might seek to restrict such board action in cases where a requisite percentage of the shareholders objected. Consider then a bylaw that applied only if, after an activist filed a Schedule 13D or otherwise "engaged" the company, shareholders representing a larger ownership stake than that announced by the activist in its Schedule 13D
were to file a written demand with the corporation within a specified period, asking the board not to settle with the activist by appointing its nominees. In effect, such a bylaw would bar private settlements and require that the matter be settled instead by a shareholder vote at the annual meeting (unless a majority of the objecting shareholders later withdrew their demand). The core idea here is that, in the event of an activist engagement, the diversified shareholders could seek to block private settlements (without their consent) if they filed a demand supported by a larger percentage of shares than the activists held. The filing of such a demand would effectively assert that the activists did not represent the "silent majority" of the shareholders. This bylaw would provide that it could only be amended by shareholder action, but, procedures could be further specified in the bylaw so that these shareholders could withdraw their demand if an acceptable compromise were reached among the activists, the diversified shareholders and corporate management. In reality, such a shareholder demand would be intended to start a three-way negotiation between the activists, the "silent majority", and management.
Inevitably, there are some legal issues here, but they can be largely solved or outflanked. 63 In any event, most corporate managements would find it difficult simply to rebuff or challenge such a demand.
This demand procedure would give the diversified investor community both flexibility and leverage, as they could first meet with management and negotiate for their own candidate or candidates to join the board, turning to the demand procedure only if they were left unsatisfied. A perceptive corporate management might welcome (and even adopt) such a bylaw, because it would be a clear signal to activists that they would encounter stiff resistance at such a company. 64 This signal might deter some activist engagements, and that may be an important virtue of this bylaw.
B. Restricting Informed Trading
Information leakage can injure the corporation and its shareholders in at least two ways: first, premature disclosure may disable the corporation from exploiting opportunities or working out problems, which it could have done if it had more time. The facts of the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case illustrate this problem, as heavy insider trading forced the company to disclose its extraordinary ore strike before it could buy the mineral rights on the land surrounding its test drill holes. 65 In other cases, misappropriated
63 First and foremost is the possibility that a shareholder-adopted bylaw may be deemed invalid (at least in Delaware) if it fails to contain language or a provision reserving to the corporation's directors their power to fulfill their fiduciary duties and reach a private settlement in a specific case. See CA, Inc. v AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.ad 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (determining that shareholder approved bylaws may not usurp the board's power to exercise its fiduciary duty). Several answers are possible to this objection. First, language could be inserted giving the board such power, but only after they fully consulted with the shareholders filing the demand. Second, if the corporate management sensibly realized that such a provision insulated them, they could, themselves, amend the certificate of incorporation to add the same provision (which would then no longer be subject to such a legal challenge). Or, the board could amend the bylaws themselves (which arguably should be effective). Even if the bylaw could not be fully enforced, it could still have considerable impact on a corporation that did not want to offend its "permanent shareholders." A second problem is that the solicitation of shareholders to sign such a written demand might be deemed a solicitation subject to the proxy rules. However, several exemptions from the proxy rules seem available here. Rule 14a-2(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2), exempts solicitations "where the total number selected is not more than ten," Less than ten institutional investors could easily hold 7% or 8% of the issuer's stock. Also, those asking institutional investors to sign such a demand could claim the exemption afford by Rule 14a-2(b)(1) because they would not be seeking proxy authority. The bottom line is that they legal problems here can be solved. 64 Of course, one impact of such a bylaw or charter provision might be to cause activists to directly approach the institutional investor community and work out their proposal with them before approaching the company. But this is desirable.
information may be seized and exploited by others, again injuring the corporation. Second, even if premature disclosure does not injure the corporation, informed trading in the corporation's stock causes its bid/ask spread to widen, and this cost falls on all shareholders. Indeed, even those shareholders who do not trade bear it indirectly, because it raises the cost of capital to the corporation. Small as this cost may be in individual transactions, the aggregate cost across the market is large.
One response to the evidence earlier noted that informed trading occurs regularly once activist nominees (and particularly activist employees) are appointed to the board is to say: enforce the law! If this is unlawful, then arguably there should be criminal prosecutions. But that response, while understandable, may be oversimple. There are both legal uncertainties and enormous problems of proof in relying on criminal sanctions or SEC civil enforcement. This section will briefly survey these problems and then turn to a proposed rule change that would expand the definition of "group" under the Williams Act, in part in order to simplify insider trading enforcement.
1. Legal Uncertainties. Much trading by hedge funds who are planning an engagement with a corporation appears to be lawful. For example, assume that one activist hedge fund (the Mars fund) tells five other funds that it is planning to file a Schedule 13D in 2 weeks, with respect to Widget Corp., which document would list its demands, including that Widget's CEO be replaced. All parties to this communication understand that a significant stock market jump will follow the filing of the Schedule 13D
(probably an abnormal return of 7% or so). But those trading on this information do not violate U.S. law, because they own no fiduciary duty to Widget Corp. Similarly, if at a later point, the Mars fund approaches other activists to support it in its proxy campaign to add three directors to the Widget board, the same conclusion follows: no fiduciary duty is owed to Widget; hence no liability.
But the issues become more complex once Mars successfully appoints two directors to Widget's board. Now, the directors do owe a fiduciary duty to Widget, and any material, nonpublic information that Jupiter has paid nothing to Mars' employee, but it probably knows that Mars has compensated him.
Jupiter may then have liability on the theory that it knew that the tippee received a "personal benefit". But if the information now leaks from Jupiter to other funds who do not know the origins of the material information that they learn from the Mars' employee's relaying the information to Mars, this may be beyond the effective reach of SEC or criminal enforcement.
The prosecutor's burden in proving insider trading has been substantially simplified by a recent Second Circuit decision, United States v. Martoma, 68 which implies that a "gift" of information made by a tipper (or any successive tippee) to virtually anyone also violates the law, even if no "benefit" is given by the tippee to the tipper. But this decision would still seemingly require that the recipient of the information know that the gift was a fiduciary breach by the tipper.
The point here is that as the chain of tippees lengthens, enforcement becomes more difficult and, eventually, impossible. At some point, remote tippees do not know the source of the information. Also, the director/tipper may have had legitimate reasons for disclosing the information, first to the hedge fund employing the tipper and possibly even to its allies. If so, this employee has not aided and abetted anyone's trading violation, at least when the employee was intending only to discuss the next tactical moves with the rest of fund's management team. The relevant question thus raised is whether there is a feasible way to reduce this agency cost. In my view, the simplest means to this end would be to expand the concept of "group" under the Williams Act.
2. Redefining "Group" Here, a word of background is necessary. The driving force behind hedge fund activism is the ability of a "wolf pack" of like-minded investors to assemble quickly to threaten (or undertake) a proxy campaign. 69 If all the members of the "wolf pack" were deemed to constitute a "group" under Section 13(d)(3) of the Williams Act, the process of "wolf pack" formation would need to slow, some current members would likely refuse to join the group, and other shareholders could enter the negotiations with the issuer to suggest other board candidates. On the face of the SEC's rules under the Williams Act, this informal association of activist investors could easily be deemed a "group," 70 but recent judicial decisions have defined "group" narrowly, refusing to treat activist investors who were discussing parallel action to constitute a group. 71 Even a joint slate of directors proposed by the same investors has not sufficed to convince at least one court to deem this association of investors a "group".
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Curiously, earlier decisions had found a "group" whenever investors "reached an understanding to act in concert." 73 What explains this judicial shift? Possibly, more recent courts have been reluctant to change the balance of advantage in a takeover battle and did not wish to enjoin a lucrative tender offer over an arguably minor disclosure violation.
Today, however, the issue is not whether a tender offer should be blocked because of a possible disclosure shortcoming, but whether an activist-led minority of the shares can assemble a block and preempt the preferences of the more passive majority. In such a context, courts should be more sensitive to the likelihood that persons acting in concert have not had to disclose their identities, plans and stock positions at the time they begin to pressure the board. For example, assume that these hedge funds, each owning 3% of the target's stock, decide to pressure the target to increase its financial leverage and spin off a third of its assets. If, their decision to act in concert made them a group, they would be required to file a joint Schedule 13D, acknowledging that they were a group and disclosing their plans. But if they can avoid becoming a "group" simply be declaring that they all planned to act independently, then a Section 13D filing would not be required until one of the three crossed the five percent threshold of
Section 13(d).
This timing difference is today important because earlier notice would give a greater opportunity for other investors (such as SSGA and other diversified institutional investors) to organize and participate in the negotiations with the issuer. In contrast, in the takeover context, earlier notice only gave the target more time to activate its defenses or seek a white knight.
Even under the narrow view of "group" taken by more recent decisions, there is far more reason to find that a "group" exists when the activists are planning (or threatening) a proxy contest. Proxy contests, by definition, require collective action. In contrast those who simply buy a target's stock in the hopes that there will be a future takeover bid are not acting collectively (even if they regularly communicate). Thus, those who discuss the possibility of asking management to appoint their nominees to the board (with the inherent threat in the background that they will start a proxy contest if rebuffed) seem more properly considered a "group" than those investors who simply purchase the stock, hoping that there will be a takeover bid. Put simply, because the former need to act collectively to succeed, they are more appropriately deemed a "group".
Nonetheless, the narrowness of the recent cases poses a problem. The best answer to this problem would be a new SEC rule, defining the term "group" in the context of hedge fund activism. Here, I would suggest that such a proposed rule should define group to include:
"any association in fact of persons or entities, formal or informal, that is seeking to appoint directors to the corporation's board, whether through private negotiations or a proxy contest, including any person who has received information or plans with respect to this effort from another group member prior to the public disclosure of the campaign and who subsequently purchased stock of the issuer."
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This "group" would include all shareholders who purchased the issuer's stock after receiving such a private tip from any other group member. This standard accomplishes two things at once: first, it would exclude the public shareholder who only learns from press reports or news media that activists are seeking to advance a slate of board nominees. Such people, even if they strongly support the slate, were not part of the group that organized the campaign. Second, this standard places considerable weight on the private tipping of information by an activist to its allies; this is what fuels the "wolf pack" and thus should define the group. Tips do not occur randomly; they are made to those whose support and loyalty is sought. When the lead activist tells other hedge funds (or other activists) that it is planning to file a Schedule 13D next week with respect to Widget Corp., this is not idle gossip. Rather, this is an informal invitation to form the "group", and the law should so recognize.
If those who receive such a tip and then purchase the target's stock were deemed to be members of a section 13(d) group, the consequence of using the fact of a tip from one activist to another as evidence of a group's formation would be that the existence of the "wolf pack" would have to be disclosed at a much earlier stage. Presumably, the Schedule 13D would have to be amended as each 74 Thus, any person or entity contacted by the lead activist prior to the filing of its Schedule 13D would be deemed a member of this group, if it purchased any shares in the target after that point. No formal acceptance (nor any formal rejection) would count if there were share purchases by the putative group member after this tip and before public disclosure.
additional member "joined" the team. This idea has at least occurred to the SEC. 75 Some investors would not want to join the "group" (possibly for fear of liability), but this would mean that they could not buy the target's shares (at least prior to the public disclosure of the "group" on the filing of the Schedule 13D).
Also, any poison pill adopted by the target in response to this disclosure would restrict all the "group" members, holding them to their current disclosed stake. In short, the "wolf pack" could less easily grow to the size it has reached in some recent cases. Any proxy contest would likely be a closer battle, and other shareholders might petition board to support their nominees instead.
Is there any chance that the SEC would adopt such an expanded definition of "group"? It fits easily within the statutory language and is consistent with the existing rules, but in recent years the SEC has stood mutely on the sidelines in the battles between companies and the activists engaging them. This neutrality may have in part been because the SEC knew that it would take much criticism from either the corporate community or the institutional investor community if it sided with the other side. But today, it is no longer a two-sided battle, as the institutional investor community is itself divided (with activists on one side and the "permanent" shareholder community-i.e., BlackRock, SSGA and Vanguard-on the other).
By ignoring the "wolf pack", the SEC is increasingly playing the ostrich, and rendering itself irrelevant.
C. Impact
The proposals here made will not stop or cripple hedge fund activism. Nor is that their intent.
They should reduce tipping and informed trading, and they are intended to permit the shareholders to restrict private settlements that appoint directors supported (so far as anyone knows) only by the activist "group." Possibly, these (and other reforms) might incline activist funds not to appoint their own employees to the boards of firms they engage (and that might reduce the impact on the bid/ask spread).
Still, these are modest interventions that seek only to reduce the principal agency costs associated with hedge fund activism. They increase transparency and shareholder rights, but they do not preclude activism.
V. Stockholder Wealth Maximization Versus the Public Morality
Traditionally, the debate over the degree to which management may consider the interests of other stakeholders or the public interest was essentially framed in legal terms about the nature of managerial authority and the scope of the business judgment rule. In the 1980's, the American Law 1981) . Note that Section 2.01(a) does not use the verb "maximize", but does otherwise define the corporate objective as "enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain". That, rather than serving the public or "doing good", was made the central objective of the corporation. Still, Section 2.01(b)(2) gave the board discretion to take into account "ethical considerations", but only those "reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business." Thus, purely "personal" ethical norms (for example, vegetarianism) cannot justify a deviation from shareholder wealth maximization. 77 As best as I can recall, there was some resistance within the ALI to any use of the word "maximization" (and the resulting need to discuss "short-term" versus "long-term" issues if that word was used), but no objection at all to the propositions that the corporation had to obey the law and should seek to protect employees, consumers, and others from safety and health hazards, even if it did not increase profits or stock price.
whether a deviation from a policy of pure shareholder wealth maximization will attract an activist attack.
Put differently, management's concern today in responding to ethical concerns is not that they will be sued, but that they will be voted out of office if they materially deviate from short-term profit maximization.
1.NRG Energy: A Case Study. A dramatic example of a company caught in the crossfire between different varieties of activist pressure is supplied by NRG Energy, Inc., the nation's second-largest electricity producer. 78 Under its former CEO, David Crane, NRG had announced a policy of shifting from "dirty" to "clean" energy, setting the ambitious goal of reducing its emissions of carbon dioxide by 50%
by 2030, and by 90% by 2050. 79 In pursuit of this goal, Crane caused NRG to purchase renewable energy assets -basically, small solar and wind power companies. These steps made NRG the darling of environmentalists, but NRG's stock price sank significantly (in part because of volatile natural gas prices). Eventually, this caused NRG's board in 2016 to replace Crane with NRG's chief operating officer, Mauricio Gutierrez, who, although he also favored a shift towards renewable energy, began an aggressive cost-cutting program to appease dissatisfied shareholders.
Then, early in 2017, Elliott Management and Bluescape Energy Partners, both well-known activists, purchased stakes in NRG totaling 9.4% and placed two nominees on NRG's board. These two new directors were then named to a newly created "business review committee" that was seeking cost reductions and evaluating possible asset sales by NRG. Both Elliott and Bluescape saw NRG's shift to cleaner energy as overly costly and had urged NRG to sell its renewable energy assets as a way of ending what they saw as a misadventure in political correctness. 80 In addition, one of their nominees to the NRG board, Barry Smitherman, an outspoken former Texas utility regulator, attracted much attention by describing himself as a crusader who had been "battling this global warming hoax for 6 years now." 81 38 that directors and managers once possessed to consider the public interest and morality is shrinking as a result of hedge fund activism. Whether this constitutes an agency cost can be debated, but over the long run corporations that disdain the public morality are likely to encounter more problems and crises than those that are sensitive to it.
2.The shift to passive investing. American investors are shifting away from actively managed mutual funds to indexed and passive vehicles that make little effort to pick "winners" (but have low costs and enable investors to invest in the market generally). Firms, such as Vanguard and BlackRock, are thus receiving enormous cash inflows (and, as a result, hold increased voting power). Lazard reports that over the most recent 12-month period, "passive equity funds took in $500 billion of net inflows after bringing in $250 billion inflows in the prior 12-month period." 87 For the future, passive investors appear likely to hold the balance of power in future battles between activist funds and corporate management.
The leader among indexed investors has long been Vanguard, which has also frequently expressed misgivings about activist funds. As a participant in corporate democracy, Vanguard has traditionally been a low-profile player, generally abstaining on shareholder proxy proposals made by environmentalists and other social reformers. 88 But this has recently changed. Vanguard no longer regularly abstains. Generally, it does not support proposals made by social reformers, but there are two major exceptions: proposals on gender diversity and climate change. At least in 2017, Vanguard has shifted to support these proposals. 89 Nor is it alone. Lazard also has reported that BlackRock and State Street have also voted in favor of proposals on gender diversity and climate risk. 90 The three --BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard --are the leading representations of the self-described "permanent shareholders" and regular critics of the "short-termism" of activist hedge funds. Apparently, they also now share a perspective on at least some 39 social issues (namely, gender diversity and climate change). At bottom, this reflects their common view that there are ethical policies that should not be subordinated to shareholder wealth maximization (possibly because they believe these policies are consistent with long-term shareholder wealth maximization, possibly because they sense their own shareholders favor such policies, or possibly for both reasons).
Still, even if these diversified institutional investors share common ground, they do not always agree. This was evident in the recent campaign by Trian Fund Management to place its founder, Nelson
Peltz, on the board of Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") in the most expensive proxy contest yet fought. 91 Trian held a $3.5 billion stake in P&G, but this came to only 1.5% of the stock, as P&G's market capitalization was around $235 billion. An unusually high percentage of stock (probably 40%) was held by individual investors (including many present and former P&G employees), and they traditionally vote with management. 92 Another 40% (or more) was held by institutional investors, who heavily preferred Peltz.
This left the decisive balance of the power in the hands of P&G's three largest shareholders: Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street, who collectively held more than 17% of its stock. 93 As it turned out, Vanguard, P&G's largest shareholder, backed management, while BlackRock and State Street supported Peltz. 94 This division allowed P&G to eke out a narrow 1% victory.
The message here is that these three "permanent shareholders" will sometimes be able to protect management --if they agree. But, even if they agree, they cannot always protect management from an activist attack. The Trian Fund acted, more or less, alone and did not assemble a "wolf pack". Those activists that do assemble a "wolf pack" may be able to aggregate 20% or more of the shares (particularly in companies smaller than P&G). This may enable them to outvote even a united triumvirate of Vanguard, Thus, although the outcome in contested cases may vary, a pattern of private negotiated settlements seems likely to persist.
None of this should surprise any reader of Mancur Olson's classic, The LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION. 97 It demonstrated that a well organized minority will normally defeat a larger, but more diffuse majority. Activists are the paradigm of a concentrated minority, and other shareholders are highly diffuse (and passive). Although there may be many reasons why hedge fund activists are well organized and successful, one of them appears to be that they can effectively share material, non-public information. That reason needs to be addressed.
Conclusion
Some leading economists argue that management should maximize not shareholder value, but shareholder welfare. 98 Unfortunately, that will remain an unrealizable and utopian ideal under current institutional structures in which shareholder voting is controlled by institutional managers compensated to maximize short-term return. The most that can be anticipated is that "permanent shareholders' (i.e., largely indexed institutional shareholders, such as Vanguard and BlackRock) may sometimes resist activists focused largely on the short-term. That goal, however, requires assistance.
Hedge fund activism may, on balance, be for the better or the worse. No bottom line assessment is here offered. But it is the beneficiary of a perverse subsidy to the extent that informed trading accompanies it and benefits at least some of those associated with it.
Both the problems identified in this article --(1) the prevalence of informed trading, and (2) the ability of an organized minority to preempt the majoritarian preference --can be addressed by legal rules and reforms that will not preclude, or even seriously chill, legitimate shareholder activism. Also, to the extent that this article shines sunlight on the practice of nominating hedge fund employees to corporate boards and shows that in-house nominees result in greater information leakage, this evidence may
